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Kerr: Ben Avon South of the Border

COMMENT
BEN AVON SOUTH OF THE BORDER*
WVMVIAm ANDrEW

KEPi* *

Ben Avon was "born" just north of the West Virginia-Pennsylvania border in the famous Ben Avon Borough controversy of 1920.1
When he was summoned south of the border the following year to
assist the Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Company in its
dispute with the West Virginia Public Service Commission, the
United Fuel Gas case 3 was thrown up as a stumbling block in his
path. That case, decided by the West Virginia supreme court six
years earlier, had held that a court could not substitute its opinion
for that of the public service commission. To do so would be to
act legislatively in violation of the separation of powers clause of
the state constitution. However, Ben Avon came armed with the
knowledge that the due process clause of the Federal Constitution requires a court to exercise an independent judgment as to
the facts when confiscation is claimed in rate cases. As a result,
a "perfect dilemma" was presented. "If, then, the proper interpretation of the opinion in the United Fuel Gas case is that the
separation of powers clause forbids the court from exercising an
independent judgment as to both law and facts, the separation of
powers clause, as interpreted, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
From the standpoint of the legislature, a perfect dilemma is presented . . . . Separation of powers, the cardinal principle upon
which the federal and all the state governments are founded, a
great American contribution to the science of government, violates
the due process clause! Such an absurd result surely proves the
unsoundness of either the United Fuel Gas case or the Ben Avon
case, or both."4 Needless to say, Ben Avon, with the backing of
* Many writers state that the Ben Avon rule no longer exists. If this is

true, then the question discussed in the instant article, i.e., whether the West
Virginia cases comply with the Ben Avon requirements, is rendered purely
academic. However, the opinion is not unanimous. In Opinion of the Justices,

328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952), the justices state that they prefer to
see the death certificate before being convinced that the rule is dead.
S*LL.B., West Virginia University 1957.

1Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
2 Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
89 W. Va. 786, 110 S.E. 205 (1921).
3 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S.E.
931 (1914).
4
Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270, 292 (1938).
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the United States Supreme Court, 5 won the case for the Bluefield
Company.
The United Fuel Gas case0 is universally cited for the proposition that a court cannot substitute its opinion for that of a commission. If the court did lay this down as an inflexible and absolute
-rule, then the dilemma is perfect. But it seems that the court's
opinion can be construed to the effect that this was laid down
only as a general rule, subject to certain exceptions. This case was
the first rate confiscation case and the first case to come before the
court after the creation of the public service commission. As a
result the court was called upon for the first time to construe the
validity and effect of the legislative act. It first held that its power
was original rather than appellate; then it proceeded to discuss its
reviewing power. Because of the separation of powers clause in the
state constitution, a court cannot substitute its opinion for that of
the commission. Otherwise, the actions of the commission would
be worthless; the salaries paid the commissioners would be money
wasted. After indulging in these generalities, the court cited Inter1 and stated that
state Commerce Comm'n v. Union Pacific R.R.,
orders of the commission "are final and not subject to judicial interference unless '(1) beyond the power which it could constitutionally
exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3) based upon a
mistake of law.' But it is there said, that questions of fact may be
so involved in the determination of questions of law, that an order
regular on its face may be set aside if it appears that, '(4) the rate
is so low as to be confiscatory...; or (5) if the commission acted
so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to the evidence
...
;or (6) if authority therein involved has been exercised in such
an unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary
rule that substance and not the shadow determines the validity of
the exercise of the power.' "8 After thus discussing its reviewing
power, the court turns to the facts of the particular case before it.
First it finds that the act is valid and concludes that the first four
assignments of error must be dismissed. These four assignments
cover the first three exceptions listed above, constitutional authority, statutory authority, and mistake of law. Thus, the court exer5
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
262 U.S. 679 (1928).
6Note 3 supra.
7222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912).
8United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 73 W. Va. 571, 588,
80 S.E. 931, 936 (1914).
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cised an independent judgment as to these exceptions. Then it
says, " [A] nd we may say en passant, and apropos to the suggestion
that said order is based on a mistake of law involving questions of
fact, that there is not presented any controverted fact justifying a
holding that the rate . . . is so low as to be confiscatory, or is the
result of arbitrary and unjust action . . . ."9 It then proceeds to

the issue in the case which is whether discrimination between the
customers of the utility was justified. What did the court mean
by the above quoted language? As to the latter three exceptions
listed where questions of fact are mixed with questions of law,
would the court have exercised an independent judgment as to
both the law and the facts involved had some "controverted fact
justifying a holding" been presented? Controverted means disputed, so would the court have exercised its own independent
judgment on such a fact in determining confiscation? Is the stating that there is no basis for a holding of confiscation alone the
exercise of an independent judgment? If so, then the United Fuel
Gas case could be considered as a forerunner of the Ben Avon case.
The second rate confiscation case in West Virginia also preceded the Ben Avon case, Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public
Service Commdn.10 There the court exercised an independent judgment as to the issue of confiscation, but based its decision solely
upon the question of a mistake of law. It is interesting to note that
the court expressed an independent opinion as to the facts involved,
although this was not used as the basis of its decision.
In that case, the company requested an increase in rates and
the commission granted only a partial increase. An appeal was
taken on the basis "that the rates allowed by the commission upon
any theory of the case are confiscatory of the petitioner's property,
not yielding to it a reasonable return upon the value of the property devoted to the public service."" The utility contended that
$300,000 instead of $150,000 should have been allowed for amortization in establishing the rate base. The court found that amortization was proper since the gas would be exhausted in five years and
that then the plant would be worth only salvage. "In order to
determine whether or not the Public Service Commission has adequately allowed for this purpose, it is necessary to review the fiscal
9 Id. at 585, 80 S.E. at 937.
1084 W. Va. 638, 100 S.E. 551 (1919).
1 Id. at 642, 100 S.E. at 552.
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history of the petitioner."12 It found that during the first eleven
years, the company had allowed only $300,000 total for depreciation, approximately $30,000 a year. Said the court, ". . . [D]uring
these eleven years the petitioner itself allowed less than $30,000.00
a year to accomplish a purpose for which it now claims $150,000.00
a year is entirely inadequate ....
[Ilt would be manifestly unjust to charge those who consume the gas during that last five years
with practically the entire cost of the plant, in addition to a reasonable return upon the entire investment therein." 13 Thus the
court concluded that the company should have been amortizing
its plant during its entire existence. It proceeded to calculate a
reasonable sum for amortization assuming that the valuation was
$2,000,000 rather than the $1,500,000 set by the commission, and
found that $100,000 would have been reasonable. "It will thus be
seen that instead of the Public Service Commission fixing too small
an amount for the proper amortization of the investment, they have
fixed it larger than might be justified ....
."14 Had the court
stopped here, Ben Avon would have been completely satisfied, but
it went on to base its decision upon a question of a mistake of
law. "It is quite true that rate making is the exercise of legislative power, and where it depends upon the ascertainment of results from disputed facts, the determination of the legislature or,
in this case, the Public Service Commission in lieu thereof, will
not be reviewed, but where such determination is reached by a
misapplication of legal principles to the state of facts disclosed, this
Court will make a correct application of such principles in determining whether or not the rate fixed by the legislative authority is
confiscatory." 5r It stated that the utility should have been amortizing during its entire life, a principle of law. "... [H] ad the commission applied a proper proportion of the petitioner's receipts for
the years 1904-1914 to the reduction of its investment instead of
treating practically the whole thereof as earnings, the value of this
plant at this time would have been found to be less than it was
by the Commission. In other words, by the application of the
legal principles we have above laid down, to the state of facts
which it is conceded exists here, the investment of the stockholders
in the petitioner had been more than fifty per cent returned to
them by the year 1914, and the investment in the plant should
Id. at 650,
13 Id. at 651,
14 Id. at 652,
15 Id. at 653,
12

100
100
100
100

S.E.
S.E.
S.E.
S.E.

at 555.
at 556.
at 556.
at 557.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss2/4

4

Kerr: Ben Avon South of the Border

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
have been reduced to that extent. We think the Commission has
dealt as liberally with the petitioner . . . as could reasonably be
expected." 16 This case may be an indication by the court that the
United Fuel Gas case is to be interpreted to the effect that the
court would not have exercised an independent judgment as to the
facts had a controverted fact been presented. However, it is not
necessarily authority for that point since a clear mistake of law
actually was involved here.
The first case to follow the Ben Avon case was the Bluefield
case referred to earlier.17 In that case the commission adopted a
rate base from the investment cost and the utility claimed that the
reproduction new cost less depreciation should be the basis. The
court began its opinion by stating that the commission reached its
decision after "maturely and carefully considering" 8s the evidence.
After restating the evidence, the court said, "In our opinion the
commission was justified by the law and by the facts in finding as a
basis for ratemaking the sum of $460,000.00."' 9 It went on to hold
that as a matter of law the actual fair value of the investment is
the true basis for ratemaking. The utility alleged that an eight per
cent return was grossly inadequate. Said the court, "It is probably
unnecessary to consider this question. Assuming that the correct
amount is the present actual value of the property devoted to the
public use, the commission appears to have reached its conclusion
by considering, not only the cost of reproduction new less depreciation, but all other proper elements throwing light upon the subject
....20 This is not an independent opinion, but the court added,
"Is not 6% net, clear of taxes and all operating expenses, including
a sum equal to 2% for depreciation, as good or better than returns
from most enterprises of a similar character? Legislatures and
public service commissions . . . are not to be tied down to fixed
rates of income. Every case must be controlled by its own facts,
and in no case will the courts interfere unless the rate allowed is
unreasonably low or unreasonably high."21 Did the court or did
it not give an independent judgment? It did give an independent
opinion as to the question of law involved, and it may have given
an opinion that eight per cent return is reasonable but without
going into the facts and circumstances.
16 Id. at 653, 100 S.E. at 557.
17 Note2 supra.
1889 W. Va. 736, 738, 110 S.E. 205, 206 (1921).
19 Id. at 739, 110 S.E. at 206.
20 Id. at 742, 110 S.E. at 208.
211d. at 743, 110 S.E. at 208.
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case was
reversed. There the Supreme Court said that reproduction cost
new less depreciation should be the basis for ratemaking and that
it felt that eight per cent was not a sufficient return. Thus it would
seem that the West Virginia court was reversed because of a mistake of law and not because it had failed to give an independent
judgment. However, the Supreme Court adverted to the method
used by the West Virginia court and cautioned that an independent judgment was necessary. It referred to the statements throughout the lower court's opinion (the commission reached its decision
after maturely considering the evidence, the commission was justified in finding, etc.) and to earlier West Virginia cases (which were
not confiscation cases) where the court had said that it could not
substitute its opinion for that of the commission, and cited the
Ben Avon case for authority that the court must exercise an independent judgment in confiscation cases. But the question still
remains as to whether the West Virginia court did exercise an
independent judgment. What did the court mean when it said,
"In our opinion the commission was justified by the law and by
the facts in finding . . ."?22 It could mean that the court had
exercised an independent judgment and agreed with the commission or that the court had found that there was substantial evidence
to support the commission. In the instant case, it seems that the
former was meant. It may be that the Supreme Court itself was
not sure, but merely wanted to warn the West Virginia court in
case that the latter interpretation was correct.
Whatever may have been the purpose of the Supreme Court's
dicta, the West Virginia court seems to have listened to the advice
because in the next case it clearly stated that it had a duty to exercise an independent judgment and it proceeded to do so. In
Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 23 the commission refused a rate increase. One commissioner wrote an opinion stating
that the rate base was $1,500,000 and concluding that the utility
was receiving a fair return. Two commissioners dissented from
the rate base as determined, but, without attempting to fix a proper
base, agreed that a fair return was being realized. The utility
contended that the commission failed to ascertain the facts, no
rate base having been found. The court said that it would have
to determine the rate base in order to prevent confiscation. It then
22

Note 19 supra.
W. Va. 557, 121 S.E. 716 (1924).

2395
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proceeds to review the individual items set forth by the utility's
witnesses and expressly states its own opinion as to the correctness
of each item with no reference to the commission's action. Then
it said, "We are asked by the company to exercise our independent
judgment upon the evidence and determine the rate base. This we
would do if we had sufficient facts before us. We are not disposed
at any time to shirk our duty; but to determine the value upon the
basis of reproduction new, less depreciation, we must know how
much that depreciation is." 24 The court then proceeds to determine the depreciation and a rate base, $2,603,765, which it termed
the "reconstructed rate base."25 It then reviewed the present rates
to see what the present rate of return was. "So while Chairman
Divine ascertains the rate base to be but $1,564,121.03, the actual
earnings at present rates produce a net income of 26% on that
base instead of 16%. It is quite apparent on this data that we
could not reverse the order of the commission; we cannot find
from it as a matter of fact that the company's property is being
confiscated by a too low rate. It is not our duty to fix rates; that
is not a judicial function. It is the business of the commission to
do that, and for the court to determine judicially whether the rate
is so low as to confiscate the utility's property, or so high as to
confiscate the customer's property."25 It concluded, "However, it
appears that during the years 1917 to 1921 the company has been
earning 8% for return and 8% for depreciation on a valuation of
more than $2,500,000, or about 26% on a rate base of over $1,564,121.03 as found by Chairman Divine."27 The order was reversed,
though, because, "We are, however, of opinion that the reproduction new value, less depreciation would be properly increased by a
proper charge for overhead costs ....,28 Since there was no evidence on this matter, the court could not include this item in its
calculations as to the reconstructed rate base. Thus it wanted to
give the company an opportunity to present proper proof of this
item. From this discussion, it appears that Ben Avon was completely satisfied with the action of the West Virginia court in this
case.
241d. at 576, 121 S.E. at 728.
251d. at 577, 121 S.E. at 728.

26 Ibid.

Id. at 580, 121 S.E. at 724.
28 Ibid.
27
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There has been a wide divergence of opinion as to the interpretation of the next confiscation case. 29 The utility alleged confiscation and challenged the commission's action on several grounds.
It first contended that the rate base was too low. The court
seemed to by-pass this contention on a ground somewhat similar
to estoppel. The company, when before the commission, had
agreed to accept the book value as the actual value rather than to
take the time and expense for an appraisal. "If it had appeared to
the Commission that the utility was contending for a rate base
different from the book value, evidence no doubt would have been
taken .... Expense and delay would have followed. The utility
desired to avoid such delay and expense and by counsel so announced."30 It then turned to the big item which was the refusal
of the commission to accept the company's evidence that its earnings would be one million dollars less than that of the current year.
Here the court pointed out that this was mere speculation and not
sufficient to overcome the evidence afforded by the history of the
company. The final ground was that the allocation of rates between wholesale and domestic customers was improper because
the rates to the domestic customers was confiscatory, the cost of
delivery being higher than the rate charged. The court reviewed
the facts and found that a 16.72% profit was realized on the entire
property. It concluded, "The rates now fixed bring in a fair return
upon the entire property and are not confiscatory." 3 ' It then reviewed the evidence as to the rate base allocated to the domestic
customers and found a 17.60% return. "So, we cannot say the
We cannot substitute our judgment for
Commission erred ....
that of the Commission . ...,"32 Again we are faced with the
question of what is meant by the court. However, the court goes
on, ".... [T] he evidence of a greater rate base.... is not sufficient
for us to say that the Commission erred in adopting that base;...
and that upon the rate base fixed the utility has received a net
income sufficient to refute the claim of confiscation. Confiscation
is the basis of the application for reversal .... and we have examined
the evidence .. .to ascertain if there has been a misinterpreta29

Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 W. Va. 68,
132 S.E. 497 (1926). In Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Company Case
and the Valuation of Railroads, 40 HARv. L. REv. 1088, 1076 (1927), the
case is interpreted as following the Ben Avon case. Davis, supra note 4, at
299, interprets the case as being contra to the Ben Avon case.
30 101

W. Va. 63, 66, 182 S.E. 497, 498 (1926).
31Id. at 69, 182 S.E. at 499.
32 Id. at 71, 182 S.E. at 500.
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tion of legal principles or a mistake as to the evidence, or no evidence on which to base the findings; all for the purpose of ascertaining if the rates prescribed are so inadequate as to amount to
confiscation ... ."33 It concludes, "In determining whether rates
are confiscatory the courts will review the evidence to see if the
commission has based its finding of fact upon a mistake of the
evidence or without evidence."3 4 Thus it appears that the Ben
Avon rule has again been applied. Does the syllabus conform to
this analysis? Syllabus one reads, "An order of the Public Service
Commission fixing rates... will not be disturbed unless it appears
that the finding of fact on which the order is based is contrary to
evidence, or without evidence, or there has been a misapplication
of legal principles; and where there is a substantial conflict of evidence on any question of fact, the probative value accorded by
the Commission to such evidence will not be disturbed."35 Standing alone, this does not seem to include the Ben Avon rule. However, syllabus two says, "When a rate fixed by the Commission is
attacked as confiscatory, the burden of proving it to be so is upon
the public utility, and unless the evidence is clear that the rate is
too low to afford a reasonable return on the value of the property
used and useful in the service of the public the order fixing the
rate will not be disturbed."3 61 This clearly contemplates the Ben
Avon rule, and gives added weight to the opinion that this case
follows the Ben Avon case.
During the same term at which the preceding case was determined, the court decided the sixth confiscation case.37 In some
way, it was able to cite the Pittsburgh case and yet reach the opposite result. The commission granted an increase in certain proposed rates and refused others. The city of Huntington and other
patrons protested and the utility cross-assigned error on the ground
of confiscation. First the utility claimed that the rate base or fair
value of its property was set too low because the amount was
determined without proper consideration of the evidence relating
to reproduction cost. It had two estimates by engineers based on
the cost of reproduction new, less depreciation. The commission
had set as the value the actual cost shown on the company's books
33

Id. at 72, 132 S.E. at 500.
73, 132 S.E. at 501.

34 Id.at
35
36

Id. at 63, 132 S.E. at 497.

Ibid.

37 City of Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 W. Va. 378, 133
S.E. 144 (1926).
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without deduction for depreciation. Said the court, "These figures,
adopted by the Commission . . . not only accord with the evidence.., but also find support in the fact that the greater portion
of the equipment was installed during a period of high prices.
Besides, the cost of reproduction new, less depreciation, is to be
3 s
accepted merely as an element and not as the standard of value."
By stretching this statement, we might interpret it as an independent judgment, but this would be questionable. To make this conclusion more probable, the court added, "We cannot say ... that
the finding of the Commission was either against the weight of the
evidence or without evidence to support it. Findings of fact by
the Public Service Commission will not be reviewed unless it has
acted arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to the evidence, or without evidence to support them."3 9 The Pittsburgh
case is cited. The court must have been referring to the first
syllabus of the Pittsburgh case as set forth above. This stated the
general rule to be followed in reviewing rate cases. The court may
have overlooked the second syllabus. However, a more reasonable
hypothesis is that the court acted in this case upon the assumption that confiscation was not involved. It may have thought that
Ben Avon applied only where the utility claimed confiscation and
that this case was one in which the patrons were appealing, overlooking the cross-assignment of error on the ground of confiscation.
The last confiscation case to be reviewed by the court was
Bluefield Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.40 The commission had refused an increase in rates. An appeal was taken
because of (1) the valuation fixed as the rate base, (2) the rate of
depreciation allowed and (3) the conclusion that the present return was an ample return of the company's investment.
The court divided the first ground into three parts:
(a) The company claimed a higher physical property valuation. This was due to a single item which was valued according
to a 1913 book value. An appraisal in 1913 had valued the property higher than the book value, so the company asserted that the
book value was too low and that the appraisal was correct. Said
the court, "It is a fair assumption that a corporation will ordinarily
record the correct value of its property on its own books. The
books should therefore be considered as offering more dependable
38 Id at 380, 133 S.E. at 145.
39 Id. at 382, 183 S.E. at 146.
40

102 W. Va. 296, 135 S.E. 833 (1926).
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evidence of value, than the higher estimates of appraisers or witnesses, unless some plausible reason is advanced why the book
value is too low. Davis v. Gas Co. P.U.R. 1921 B, 842. In this
case the appraisers were not called as witnesses. The personnel of
the appraisers is not disclosed. The manner in which the appraisal
was conducted does not appear. No witness testified that the appraisal value was correct or explains why the book value was
inaccurate. We therefore cannot disapprove the action of the
Commission in adopting the utility's 1913 book value." 41 This
presents the problem of interpretation as discussed previously, but
it seems reasonable to assume that the court gave an independent
judgment.
(b) The company claimed a higher working capital. This was
justified because the company was doing a large amount of construction work and thus, to obtain good prices on its purchases, it
bought in large quantities. The commission found a $40,000 stock
of supplies too large because the gross operating costs were only
$17,500 per month. It allowed $22,500 for such stock of supplies.
The court stated that some cases allow 1/12 of the annual operating
expenses as working capital and others allow the working capital
to be the value of 1/12 of the annual expenses plus an allowance
for materials and supplies. It then concluded, ". . . [T]he commission being apprised that the monthly operating expenses approximate $17,500.00 has allowed for supplies $22,500.00. We
cannot say from the evidence that this sum is inadequate." 42 Again
this seems to be an independent opinion.
(c) The company asserted a higher going concern value solely
on the opinion of its accountant who said 15% of the value should
be allowed. The commission said that percentage rules could not
be used, but that the history of the corporation should be considered. The court reviewed various cases and held that no hard
and fast rule could be followed. "In determining the going concern
value of the utility in this case, the Commission has but followed
the course supported by reason and the highest precedent." 43 Thus
the court treated this as a question of law.
The company's second ground was that it had the right to
depreciate the property at 5.97 per cent. The commission said 4%
411d. at 298, 185 S.E. at 884.
42 Id. at 800, 185 S.E. at 885.
431d. at 801, 185 S.E. at 886.
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was sufficient. The court looked to the record and found that a
rate of 5.97% had been charged annually but that 2.21% was actually
used during the past years. A reserve of $300,000 thus remained.
The court then proceeded to rule that, "A depreciation rate which
accumulates and retains a surplus 'beyond the reasonable requirements of the company,' should not be foisted upon the patrons of
a utility ....In the present case the depreciation reserve amounts
to practically 30% of the value of the Company's property. The
decisions oppose the accumulation of such a large reserve ....
[W] e thoroughly approve of the reduction in the rate made by
the Commission."4 4 Again this appears to be an independent
judgment
The company's last contention was that the rate of return
was not reasonable. The court reviewed the figures showing expenses and income and found that an 8% return existed. It then
said, ".
. 8% is ordinarily considered a sufficient return for
telephone companies, and nothing appears in this record to show
that it is not ample in this case." 45 Had the court stopped here,
it would seem to be clear that an independent judgment was
given. But it went on to say that the petitioner's case was based
solely upon its accountant's opinion and that this was not sufficient
to overthrow the commission's opinion based on the company's
history. "The reasons advanced by the Commission for its several
rulings show careful consideration of the claims of the applicant,
and are therefore entitled to the utmost respect. The solution of
problems such as these is peculiarly within the province of the
Commission. In this case the Commission has exercised its judgment in good faith. We find no reason to question the result."46
The United Fuel Gas case is cited. This paragraph of the opinion
again must be interpreted. The court says that the commission
has used careful consideration and has acted in good faith. But
the final statement seems to indicate an independent judgment,
the court finding nothing upon which to question the commission's result. The preceding analysis of the court's discussion of
the evidence seems to add weight to this interpretation, as does
44

Id. at 808, 135 S.E. at 886.
185 S.E. at 836.

461d. at 804,
461d. at 804,

135 S.E. at 887.
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the syllabus. Syllabus one reads, "An order of the Public Service

Commission will not be annulled by this court unless the order
manifests unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power.
Judicial review should extend no further than is necessary to keep
the Commission within the law, and protect the Constitutional
rights of the corporation which it controls." 47 The due process
clause embodies one of the constitutional rights of the corporation. Thus the court will review to prevent confiscation. If this
interpretation of the case is correct, Ben Avon again is satisfied in
the most recent of the West Virginia confiscation cases.
Since 1911 when the public service commission first began to
regulate public utility rates, there have been seven confiscation
cases in West Virginia.4 8 Two preceded the Ben Avon case; five
followed it. Of these latter five, all but one seem to satisfy the
Ben Avon requirements. However, all of them have been interpreted as being contra to the Ben Avon case. 49 The difference seems
47 Id.at 296, 135 S.E. at 833.
48 Eight other rate cases involving a consideration of the rate base have

been reviewed by the court: City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm'n,
83 W. Va. 718, 99 S.E. 63 (1919); City of Charleston v. Public Service
Comm'n, 86 W. Va. 536, 103 S.E. 673 (1920); City of Charleston v. Public
Service Comm'n, 95 W. Va. 91, 120 S.E. 398 (1923); Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 670, 180 S.E. 131 (1925); City of
Elkins v. Public Service Comm'n, 102 W. Va. 450, 136 S.E. 397 (1926);
Town of Harrisville v. Public Service Comm'n, 103 W. Va. 526, 138 S.E. 99
(1927); City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm'n, 110 W. Va. 245, 159
S.E. 38 (1931); and City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149,
175 S.E. 339 (1934).
Seven of these are, for the lack of a better term, confiscation cases in
reverse. The patrons rather than the utilities appeal on the ground that the
rate base is too high. In such cases the general rule as to substantial evidence
applies since the Ben Avon case requires an independent judgment only where
the utility claims confiscation.

In the Baltimore & Ohio case, rates prescribed by the commission were

attacked as being unreasonable and unjust to the protesting carriers and as
being prejudicial. Evidence was presented as to cost and comparative rates.
The court said at page 672, "The consideration of this proof and the testimony
of the carriers . . . involved a substantial question of fact peculiarly within
the province of the Commission. We cannot substitute our judgment for that
of the commission on the weight of the evidence. Its findings are presumed
to be reasonable, lawful, and correct; and will therefore not be set aside on
appeal to this Court unless clearly against the weight of the evidence." The
United Fuel Gas case is cited. The question here is what is meant by "unreasonable and unjust." Does the utility mean that the rates are confiscatory?
There may be a difference between unreasonable and unjust and confiscatory.
If the utility meant the latter (and this cannot be determined from the court's
reported opinion) then this case clearly violates the Ben Avon rule. But if the
court assumed that confiscation was not involved, the case is correctly decided.
49
Davis, supra note 4, at 284 et seq.
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COMMENT
to be in the interpretation of the words and sentences extracted
and discussed above. It may well be that the interpretation adopted
by the reader will depend upon his regard for the Ben Avon case
or his need for cases to support or disprove the Ben Avon rule. 50

GOUnited Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Cornm'n, 99 S.E.2d 1, was decided July 5, 1957, shortly after the completion of this paper. In it the appellant company contended that the order setting rates was (1) not supported
by the evidence and (2) confiscatory. The court reversed first because the
evidence did not support one finding of fact and secondly because of two mistakes of law, the use of the allocation method instead of the segregation method
and the use of the peak month method instead of the peak day method by the
commission in its determinations. The issue of confiscation thus was not
reached. The question then still remains. Will the court, after finding that a
finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence, proceed to state its own
independent opinion as to the weight of the evidence after a claim of confiscation is raised?
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